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THE "BERMUDA TRIANGLE?" 
THE CERT POOL AND ITS INFLUENCE 
OVER THE SUPREME COURT'S AGENDA 
Barbara Palmer* 
It has been called a "monopoly," a "swamp," a "Leviathan," 
and even "the Bermuda Triangle."' The culprit: the Supreme 
Court's cert pool, the system of randomly assigning petitions for 
review to a single clerk for a recommendation regarding accep-
tance or denial of a case. Former Supreme Court clerk and so-
licitor general, Kenneth Starr, recently lamented that Supreme 
Court justices have abdicated their responsibility in screening 
cases for review and have ceded too much power to their clerks; 
cases worthy of the justices attention go into the cert pool, but 
they never come out. According to Starr, the cert pool "is at war 
with Justice Louis Brandeis' proud proclamation that the jus-
tices, unlike high government officials from the other branches, 
do their own work." Moreover, the cert pool "squander[ s] a 
precious national resource-the time and energy of the justices 
themselves." Others agree that the cert pool is a "very danger-
ous proposition."2 In 1998, USA Today conducted a five month 
study on the "effect and growing influence of law clerks," with 
several stories devoted to the influence of the cert pool.3 In ad-
* Assistant Professor, Washington Semester Program, American University. The 
author wishes to thank John Jacob, Archivist, at the Justice Lewis F. Powell Archives, 
Washington & Lee University School of Law, and Joe Kobylka, Southern Methodist 
University. All sources from the Powell Archives used in this article are on file with the 
author. 
I. All quotes are taken from Kenneth W. Starr, Trivial Pursuits at the Supreme 
Court, Wall Street Journal A17 (Oct. 6, 1993), and Kenneth W. Starr, Supreme Court 
Needs a Management Revolt, Wall Street Journal A23 (Oct. 13, 1993). 
2. Roger K. Lowe, Most Supreme Court Justices Let Clerks Screen New Cases, Co-
lumbus Dispatch 9A (Oct. 1, 1993), available in LEXIS, News Library, Columbia Dis-
patch File. 
3. Tony Mauro, The Hidden Power Behind the Supreme Court Justices Give Piv-
otal Role to Novice Lawyers, USA Today IA (Mar. 13, 1998); Tony Mauro, Justices, 
Court-Watchers Concerned with Clerks' Clout, USA Today 13A (Mar. 13, 1998); Tony 
Mauro, Tactics, Law Clerks Influence High Court's Agenfk, USA Today lOA (Dec. 23, 
1998); Tony Mauro, Steering Clear of Controversy Court's Inaction Allows Confusion, 
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dition, at least one Justice has been publicly critical of this prac-
tice, Justice Stevens.4 All of this has created a perception of the 
justices shirking their duties and clerks determining access to the 
nation's highest bench. 
We actually know, however, very little about the role of the 
cert pool and the potential influence of clerks.5 Until now, there 
have been no systematic assessments of the role of the cert pool 
in determining the Court's agenda. With data from the 1971-
1974 and 1984-1985 Terms, this analysis focuses on two criticisms 
of the cert pool: (1) the cert pool largely determines case selec-
tion; and (2) the cert pool fosters the creation of a "cert-pool 
voting bloc" among the Justices in the pool. Surprisingly, the 
Court only took the action suggested by a cert-pool memo in ap-
proximately half the cases that were granted review. Moreover, 
little evidence exists that the cert pool fostered the creation of a 
voting bloc that controlled the Court's docket. In fact, vote-
cohesion between the justices in the cert pool actually declined 
over time. In very few cases, the cert-pool justices voted as a 
USA Today 1A (Dec. 23, 1998). 
4. Mauro, The Hidden Power Behind the Supreme Court Justices Give Pivotal Role 
to Novice Lawyers (cited in note 3). Interestingly, Stevens is currently the only Justice 
who is not a member of the cert pool. 
5. The general influence of clerks over the Supreme Court's inner-workings has 
long been a controversial topic in the popular press and news media. See David J. Gar-
row, The Lowest Form of Animal Life?: Supreme Court Clerks and Supreme Court His-
tory, 84 Cornell L. Rev 855 (1999). Two of the more "notorious" accounts of clerk con-
trol over the Court are Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong's The Brethren (Simon and 
Schuster, 1979), and Edward Lazarus' Closed Chambers (Times Books, 1998). Most of 
what we know about clerks comes from Justices' biographies or personal accounts of the 
clerks themselves. Sec Dean Acheson, Recollections of Service With the Federal Supreme 
Court, 18 Alabama Lawyer 355 (1957); Paul R. Baier, The Law Clerks: Profile of an Insti-
tution, 26 Vand. L. Rev. 1125 (1973); Alexander M. Bickel, The Unpublished Opinions of 
Mr. Justice Brandeis: The Supreme Court at Work (Belknap Press, 1957); Sidney Fine, 
Frank Murphy: The Washington Years (U. of Michigan Press, 1996); John C. Jeffries, Jr., 
Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. (Charles Scribner's Sons, 1994); Alpheus Thomas Mason, 
Harlan Fiske Stone: Pillar of the Law (Viking Press, 1956); Chester A. Newland, Personal 
Assistants to Supreme Court Justices: The Law Clerks, 40 Or. L. Rev. 299 (1961); Richard 
A. Posner, The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform (Harvard U. Press, 1985); J. Harvie 
Wilkinson, III, Serving Justice: A Supreme Court Clerk's View (Charterhouse, 1974); 
Samuel Williston, Life and Law: An Autobiography (Little, Brown and Co., 1940). What 
little academic research that exists on clerks provides a very different picture than the 
media, suggesting that the influence of clerks is often overstated. See Saul Brenner and 
Jan Palmer, The Law Clerks' Recommendations and Chief Justice Vinson's Vote on Cer-
tiorari, 18 Am. Pol. Q. 68 (1990); Kevin T. McGuire, Advocacy in the U.S. Supreme 
Court: Expertise Within the Appellate Bar, 11 Canst. Comm. 267 (1994); Karen O'Connor 
and John R. Hermann, The Clerk Connection: Appearances Before the Supreme Court By 
Former Law Clerks, 78 Judicature 247 (1995); H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide: 
Agenda Seuing in the United States Supreme Court (Harvard U. Press, 1991); Saul Bren-
ner, Error-Correction on the U.S. Supreme Court: A View from the Clerks' Memos, 34 
Soc. Sci. J. 1 (1997). 
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bloc against the non-cert pool justices. At best, evidence for the 
influence of the cert pool over the Court's agenda is quite lim-
ited. Cert-pool memos primarily serve as summaries for the jus-
tices, not as a screen. 
I. THE CREATION OF THE CERT POOL 
The cert pool was implemented in October of 1972, but 
there is very little historical record of its creation. Justice Powell 
is usually credited with the idea of streamlining the process of 
case selection,6 but Chief Justice Warren Burger also claimed 
that the cert pool was his idea.7 Unfortunately, archival docu-
mentation sheds little light on the development of the cert pool. 
In fact, if Powell was the primary force behind the cert pool, his 
personal papers are decidedly lacking in any kind of written re-
cords or memoranda regarding its creation. 8 
Although the genesis of the cert pool is unclear, the logic 
behind its creation is clear: to save time and increase efficiency. 
During the 1960's, the Court's docket had grown rapidly, reach-
ing over 4000 cases by the early 1970s, and the process of dispos-
ing of cases was unique to each Justice's chamber. With the cert 
pool, rather than each chamber reviewing every petition that 
carne to the Court, petitions would be randomly assigned in 
equal numbers to each chamber that participated in the pool. A 
clerk would then evaluate the petition and write a "cert-pool 
memo," ranging from two to twenty pages long. The memo had 
a standard format, beginning with a statement of the issues 
raised, followed by summaries of the facts of the case, the lower 
court opinion, and the contentions and arguments presented by 
the parties. At the end of the memo, the clerk would discuss 
6. See, e.g., Jeffries, Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. at 270-72 (cited in note 5); Oifford 
M. Kuhn and George E. Butler, III, "An Opportunity to be Heard": An Oral Interview 
with Lewis F. Powell, Jr., 1 Ga. J. of Southern Legal Hist. 413 (1991); William H. 
Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How it Was, How it Is (William Morrow, 1987); Bernard 
Schwartz, A History of the Supreme Court (Oxford U. Press, 1993). 
7. Kuhn and Butler, 1 Ga. J. of Southern Legal Hist. at 430 (cited in note 6). 
8. The first written memo regarding the cert pool is dated June 7, 1973. It was an 
assessment of the performance of the cert pool during its first year of operation and a 
discussion of whether it should be continued over the summer. See Supreme Court B 
Memoranda- General, Powell Archives, Wash. and Lee U. Sch. of L. Beginning in the 
fall of 1973, Powell included a section on the cert pool in the manuals he created for his 
clerks. See Supreme Court- Memoranda- Clerks B Procedures Book #1, 1973-75, and 
Procedures Book #2, 1975-82, Powell Archives, Wash. and Lee U. Sch. of L. Other than 
this, Powell's papers contain no documents regarding the actual creation of the cert pool, 
debate over how it was to be run, or any discussion of the format and content of cert-pool 
memos. 
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reasons why the cert petition should or should not be granted. 
This memo would be circulated to all the chambers in the pool. 
Upon receiving the pool memo, another clerk would "mark up" 
the memo for his or her specific justice, providing further analy-
sis or disagreeing with the pool memo's assessment. 
Unlike decisions on the merits and the circulation of opin-
ion drafts, the Justices rarely debate the decision to grant review 
to a case.9 The time pressures created by the docket simply pro-
hibit meaningful discussion of all but a few noteworthy cases. 
Given this, clerks in the cert pool could conceivably have a great 
deal of influence over the Court's agenda. With Justices spend-
ing so little time reviewing each petition, those in the pool would 
almost have to rely on cert-pool recommendations. The Justices 
in the pool share an important source of information that the 
non-cert pool justices lack, the cert-pool memo. As a result, the 
Justices in the pool would probably tend to vote together, creat-
ing a "cert pool voting bloc." Thus, it does seem logical to ex-
pect that the clerks in the cert-pool would largely determine 
which cases were selected. 
II. LOOKING AT CERT POOL MEMOS 
Empirically assessing the influence of the cert pool poses 
some significant challenges. Agreement between Justices' votes 
and clerk recommendations "does not prove that the justice[ s] 
[are] being influenced; the law clerks might be merely following 
the guidelines established" by the Court; in other words, the(o 
might be using the same criteria that the Justices are using. 0 
The Justices have specified particular criteria for screening cases, 
conflict among the circuits being one of the most important, 11 
and clerks in the cert pool obviously look for cases with these 
characteristics. On the other hand, some correlation between 
Justices' votes and pool-memo recommendations must be shown 
as a precondition of any inferences regarding influence. If there 
is little to no association between pool-memo recommendations, 
the Justices' choices, and the Court's docket, the cert pool is not 
influencing case selection. 
The most substantial problem posed by any kind of study of 
the cert pool is the availability of data. Currently, Justice Lewis 
9. See Perry, Deciding to Decide (cited in note 5); Robert L.Stem, et al., 7 Su-
preme Court Practice (Bureau of National Affairs, 1993). 
10. Brenner and Palmer, 18 Am. Pol. Q. at 68 (cited in note 5). 
II. Stern, et al., Supreme Court Practice (cited in note 9). 
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Powell's papers are the only public source of cert-pool memos. 
While Justice Powell did keep pool memos from cases the Court 
decided during his tenure, unfortunately he destroyed all his re-
cords on cases that were denied review. Consequently, it is im-
possible to assess how many times the Court voted to deny re-
view when the cert-pool memo recommended that a case should 
be granted. It is also impossible to assess how many times the 
Court agreed when the cert-pool memo recommended that a 
case should be denied review. On the other hand, the vast ma-
jority of cases that come to the Court are "frivolous," particu-
larly those filed in forma pauperis by prisoners. It stands to rea-
son that, in i.f.p. cases in particular, the clerks and the justices 
would be in agreement regarding the denial of review, not be-
cause the clerks are exerting "influence" over the Justices in the 
cert pool, but because these are indeed cases that are not worthy 
of the Court's time. 12 At any rate, while the lack of data from 
cases denied review results in an incomplete picture of the influ-
ence of the cert pool, until we have better data, it is the best we 
can do. 
With these caveats, this analysis uses data from the cert-
pool memos in the papers of Justice Lewis Powell from cases de-
cided during the 1972-1974 Terms and the 1984-1985 Terms. 13 
This allows us to assess possible changes that may have devel-
oped over time. It is conceivable that the influence of the cert 
pool was relatively limited during the first years of its operation 
given its novelty, but grew over time as the practice became in-
stitutionalized. During the 1972-1974 terms, the members of the 
cert pool were Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and 
Chief Justice Burger. Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and 
Marshall were not members. During the 1984-1985 terms, the 
members of the cert pool were Justices White, Blackmun, Pow-
ell, Rehnquist, Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice O'Connor. 
Justices Stevens, Marshall and Brennan were not members. 
Data on justices' cert votes were collected from the papers 
of Justice William Brennan from the 1971-1974 terms and the 
1984-1985 terms. 14 With cert votes from before and after the 
12. See Kuhn and Butler, 1 Ga. J. of Southern Legal Hist. at 430 (cited in note 6); 
Perry, Deciding to Decide (cited in note 6). 
13. Papers of Justice Lewis F. Powell, case folders from 1972-1974 and 1984-1985, 
Powell Archives, Wash. and Lee U. Sch. of L. 
14. Papers of Justice William J. Brennan, Part I, Boxes 417-26, 666-69,695-98, Li-
brary of Congress, Washington, D.C. Brennan's Papers are used for cert votes because 
they are much more complete than Powell's. 
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implementation of the cert pool in 1972, not only can we assess 
the impact of the cert pool on the Court's agenda, but we can 
also explore whether there were any changes in the voting be-
havior of individual Justices. 
When cases arrive at the Court, justices and their clerks 
have several options at their disposal in deciding what to do with 
a particular case. The most obvious are granting or denying re-
view to petitions for certiorari, or noting probable jurisdiction or 
dismissing appeals. The Justices may also withhold a decision on 
review until more information has been gathered. They may 
"call for a response" (CFR), which allows the respondent (the 
winning party below) to file a brief in opposition to certiorari, or 
"call for the views of the solicitor general" (CVSG), in which the 
Court invites the solicitor general to file an amicus brief, typi-
cally in cases that will potentially effect the federal government. 
Cases can also be "held," pending a decision in another case, or 
treated summarily and vacated and remanded without full ple-
nary review. 15 
15. Specifically, docket numbers were used as the unit of analysis to account for 
consolidated cases. The data include cases that came to the Court through both certio-
rari and appellate jurisdiction; appeals cases were largely treated as discretionary and 
were placed in the cert pool along with petitions for certiorari. 
Cert-pool memos were coded as follows: 
Grant the petition or note probable jurisdiction: The pool memo specifically 
states that the case should be granted or noted. This includes pool memos with 
language such as, "The Court should probably grant," or "This case is probably 
cert worthy." This also includes pool-memo recommendations that review be 
limited to specific questions within the petition or appeal. 
Imply grant or note: The pool memo provides reasons why the case should be 
granted or noted, but does not make a clear recommendation. 
Deny the petition or dismiss the appeal: The pool memo specifically states that 
the case should be denied or the appeal should be dismissed. This includes pool 
memos with language such as, "The Court should probably deny", or "This case 
is probably not cert worthy." 
Imply deny or dismiss: The pool memo provides reasons for why the case should 
be denied or dismissed, but does not make a clear recommendation. 
No recommendation: The pool memo gives reasons why the case should be 
granted/noted and reasons why the case should be denied/dismissed, or the dis-
cussion section of the memo focuses on substantive issues raised by the case. In 
other words, there is no clear indication of any particular recommendation by 
the cert-pool memo. This includes memos with language such as, "This is a 
tough case", or "This is a close case." 
Take some other action: The pool memo suggests holding for another case, va-
cating and remanding, affirming or postponing the appeal, calling for the views 
of the solicitor general (CVSG), or calling for a response from the respondents 
or appellees (CFR). 
Justices' votes were coded as follows: Grant the petition or note probable jurisdiction 
(including instances when the Justices granted review limited to specific questions), Deny 
the petition or dismiss the appeal, Take some other action (including holding for another 
case, vacating and remanding, affirming or postponing the appeal, calling for the views of 
the solicitor general- CVSG). Another option used by Justices is a "join 3" vote. There 
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III. THE CERT POOL'S INFLUENCE OVER THE 
COURT'S AGENDA 
How often did the Court actually do what the pool memo 
recommended? Table 1 shows the cert-pool recommendations 
from all cases granted review during the 1972-1974 and 1984-
1985 Terms. In the early years of the cert pool, the decision to 
grant review was largely left open by the clerks. During the 
1972-1974 period, the clerks specifically recommended that the 
Court grant review to the cert petition or appeal in only 24% of 
the cases that were granted review. 
Table 1 
Action Recommended by Cert Pool Memos in Cases 
that were Granted Review 
Grant the petition or note 
probable jurisdiction 
Imply grant or note 
Deny the petition or dismiss 
the appeal 
Imply deny or dismiss 
No recommendation 
Take some other action* 
1972-1974 
24% (73) 
9% (29) 
5% (15) 
3% (9) 
47% (144) 
13% (40) 
N = 310 
1984-1985 
51% (151) 
0 
24% (71) 
0 
.5% (1) 
25% (73) 
N=296 
* includes recommendations to hold for another case, call for the views of the 
solicitor general (CVSG) or call for a response from the respondent (CFR), or 
treat the case summarily. 
were no join 3 votes during the 1971-74 period, but by the 1984-85 period, they were rela-
tively common. Join 3 votes were coded as votes to grant review. 
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In other words, the cert-pool memo suggested that the Court 
grant review in only one-fourth of the cases that made it onto the 
Court's agenda. 
In another 9% of cases, the cert-pool memo did not specifi-
cally state that the case should be granted review; but the rec-
ommendation was implied. 16 These were cases in which the pool 
memo indicated that the criteria for granting review were pre-
sent in a particular case, but did not specifically state that a case 
should be granted review. 
In 15 cases, or 5%, the pool memo recommended that the 
case be denied, but the Court granted review; and in another 
3%, the pool memo implied that there were no reasons to grant 
the case, but the Court did anyway. Thus, 8% of the time, the 
Court did the opposite of what the cert pool recommended. 
During the first three years of the pool, by far the most 
common recommendation made by a cert-pool memo was no 
recommendation at all. In 47% of the cases that were granted 
review during the 1972-1974 terms, the clerk writing the memo 
did not take a specific position regarding whether the Court 
should grant review. In fact, it was quite common for the clerk 
to give reasons why the case should be granted, but also reasons 
why it should not be granted. 17 In almost half of all cases, the 
clerk discussed pros and cons regarding whether the case should 
be granted, specifically leaving the judgment up to the Justices. 
This suggests that cert-pool memos served primarily as summa-
ries for the Justices, rather than an initial screening method. 
Cert-pool memos provided a more efficient means of getting 
16. Kokoszka v. Belford provides a good example of this: the discussion section of 
the pool memo states that "there appears to be a direct and clear conflict .... The issue 
would seem to have importance for the many wage earner bankrupts in this country." 
Preliminary Memo, pp. 3-4, Kokoszka v. Belford, File Number 73-5265, Powell Archives, 
Wash. and Lee U. Sch. of L. 
17. A typical example is Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., et al.: the final 
discussion section of the pool memo explains that "[i]n general, only the tolling issue ap-
pears to be worthy of review, and since that issue cannot be readily separated form the 
remaining issues in the case, perhaps this is not a good case to grant. The seeming impor-
tance of the issue and the incipient conflict are strong countervailing factors, however." 
Preliminary Memo, p. 16, Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., et al., File Number 
73-1543, Powell Archives, Wash. and Lee U. Sch. of L. Another example is Williams and 
Williams Co. v. United States: the pool memo explains that "[t]his is obviously an impor-
tant case in terms of the impact upon the medical and scientific publishing industry and 
the effective operation of research libraries ... [but J this is a close case, and because it is 
the first case from the Court of Claims under this statute, the Court may want to forego 
consideration for further developments in the field." Preliminary Memo, p. 13, Williams 
and Williams Co. v. United States, File Number73-1279, Powell Archives, Wash. and Lee 
U. Sch. of L. 
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through the docket for the Justices in the pool by condensing 
case records. At least in the early years of the cert pool, the Jus-
tices were clearly making the ultimate decision to grant or deny 
review in the vast majority of cases and were still very much in 
control of their agenda. 18 
In fact, it was not until the 1981 Term, almost ten years after 
the pool's creation, that clerks began consistently recommending 
a specific course of action in the "discussion" section at the end 
of the memo. 19 In the beginning of the 1983 term, a change oc-
curred in the format of pool memos, with the addition of a final 
section entitled "Recommendation."20 This section was typically 
only one to three sentences and provided a specific statement 
regarding what the Justices should do with the case. As Table 1 
shows, during the 1984 and 1985 terms, only one cert-pool memo 
out of almost 300 did not make a specific recommendation re-
garding a particular case.21 
With cert-pool memos now making specific recommenda-
tions in every case, we would expect that the cert pool would 
have substantially more influence over the Court's agenda. It 
seems logical to expect that if the Justices now required the clerk 
writing the cert-pool memo to make a specific recommendation, 
they would follow it, at least most of the time. The addition of a 
short "Recommendation" section to the end of the pool memo 
suggests that, along with summary information, the Justices 
wanted to know what the cert-pool clerk thought should be done 
with the case. 
At Table 1 shows, the Court took the pool memo's sugges-
tion to grant cases about twice as often as it did in the early years 
18. The influence of cert-pool memos when they fell into the "take some other ac-
tion" category is probably minimal. When a cert-pool memo recommended CFR or 
CVSG, and the Court agreed, it appears that it was up to clerks in the Justices' individual 
chambers to take further action. According to Powell's manuals for his clerks, if the 
Court did, in fact, CFR or CVSG after it was recommended in a cert-pool memo, it was 
standard procedure for his clerks to write a brief update for Powell. Powell Memoranda 
to Clerks- Orientation, 1974-75, Powell Archives, Wash. and Lee U. Sch. of L. Thus, if a 
recommendation regarding review was made, it did not come from the cert pool. In ad-
dition, the number of instances in which a cert-pool memo recommended that the case be 
disposed summarily were extremely low, only 1.5% of cases granted review during the 
1972-74 period and 2% during the 1984-85 period. 
19. This was determined by searching case files in Powell's papers until consistent 
recommendations were found. There was a relatively clear break in the frequency of 
recommendations between the 1980 and 1981 terms. 
20. There are no memos in Powell's papers describing what brought about this for-
mal change. 
21. Preliminary Memo, Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc, eta/., File Number 
83-2129, Powell Archives, Wash. and Lee U. Sch. of L. 
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of its operation, but this is at least partly due to the increased 
number of recommendations in the cert-pool memos. On the 
other hand, it is quite remarkable that during the 1984-1985 
Terms, the pool memo recommended that a case be granted re-
view in only half of the cases that were actually granted review. 
Even more strikingly, the cert pool had recommended that the 
Court deny review in 24% of the cases granted. Thus, in almost 
one-fourth of the cases that were granted review, the Court ig-
nored the recommendation of the cert-pool memo. This is also a 
substantial increase over the earlier period. 
With the Court accepting half of the cases that the cert-pool 
memo recommended, the cert pool may have played a much lar-
ger role in the development of the Court's agenda by the 1984-85 
terms. On the other hand, the high number of cases in which the 
Court rejected the cert-pool recommendation indicates that even 
when clerks suggested a specific course of action, the Justices 
still made their own independent judgments regarding case se-
lection. Even in this later period, it appears that cert-pool 
memos were still serving primarily as summaries and not a 
screening-method. 
IV. THE CERT POOL'S INFLUENCE OVER THE 
CERT-POOL JUSTICES 
If the Court did what the cert-pool memo recommended 
about half the time, was it, in fact, the Justices in the cert pool 
who voted to accept these cases, or was it some combination of 
Justices in and out of the pool? If the Justices in the pool were 
voting together in these cases, this would suggest that the pool 
fostered a voting bloc that was able to determine half of the 
Court's docket. The influence of the cert pool on the Court's 
agenda would be more indirect, but still important. 
Table 2 shows how many times Justices in the cert pool 
voted together in various-sized voting blocs before the imple-
mentation of the cert pool and for the two periods after the im-
plementation of the cert pool. 
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Table 2 
Voting Blocs on the Court 
pre-pool post-pool post-pool 
1971-1972 1972-1974 1984-1985 
Number of Justices 
in the cert pool who 
voted as a bloc: 
6 15% (36) 
At least 5 32% (43) 41% (103) 35% (86) 
At least 4 74% (99) 71% (178) 64% (157) 
At least 3 100%(135) 99% (251) 95% (235) 
(N = 135) (N = 254) (N = 248) 
Number of Justices not 
in the cert pool who 
voted as a bloc: 
4 48% (123) 40% (104) 
At least 3 86% (220) 83% (215) 48% (132) 
At least 2 100%(258) 100%(259) 94% (258) 
(N = 258) (N = 259) (N = 274) 
Prior to the creation of the cert pool, during the 1971-1972 
terms, Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist and Chief 
Justice Burger, the five Justices who eventually made up the cert 
pool, voted together as a bloc of five 32% of the time. Once the 
cert pool was implemented, they voted as a bloc of five 41% of 
the time, an increase of 9%. This does suggest that the cert pool 
contributed to the development of a cert-pool voting bloc. Fur-
ther analysis, however, suggests a much murkier picture. Only 
four Justices' votes are needed to grant review, so a more accu-
rate picture of the influence of the cert pool on the Court's 
agenda is drawn by considering whether the cert pool fostered a 
bloc of four Justices among the five in the cert pool. In other 
words, how often did at least four of the five justices in the cert 
pool vote together and ensure that a case was granted? As Ta-
ble 2 shows, there was virtually no difference between the 1971-
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1972 and the 1972-1974 periods in the number of cases that at 
least four cert-pool justices voted together. If anything, there 
was a slight decline, from 74% to 71%. 
What is quite clear, however, is that by the 1984-1985 pe-
riod, ten years later, vote cohesion among pool justices had sub-
stantially declined. Admittedly, the addition of one more Jus-
tice, O'Connor, increasing the pool to six, simply makes it harder 
for them to vote as a bloc. On the other hand, the other five Jus-
tices who were in the pool from 1972-1974 were still there in 
1984-1985. They voted as a bloc of six in only 15% of the cases 
granted review. They voted as a bloc of four or more only 64% 
of the time, a measurable decrease from the earlier periods, par-
ticularly the pre-cert pool years. It should also be noted that by 
the 1984-85 period, in 5% of the cases granted review, no more 
than two Justices could agree on a chosen course of action; there 
were at least three different voting blocs among the Justices in 
the cert pool. 
Although vote cohesion among the Justices in the cert pool 
declined over time, were these Justices still more cohesive than 
the Justices who were not in the pool? Given that the number of 
non-cert-pool Justices has always been smaller than the number 
of cert-pool Justices, comparisons between the two groups are 
not precise, but the data are noteworthy. Table 2 indicates that 
the vote cohesion among the four Justices who were not in the 
pool, Justices Douglas, Brennan, Stewart and Marshall, declined 
from 48% to 40% during the 1971-1972 to 1972-1974 periods. 
They did vote as a bloc of three, however, well over 80% of the 
time during both periods. Without a cert pool, these Justices' 
votes were still relatively cohesive. During the 1984-1985 period, 
the three remaining non-cert pool Justices voted together as a 
bloc only half the time, in 48% of the cases granted review, sug-
gesting that the decline in vote cohesion over this ten year pe-
riod was a Court-wide phenomenon. 
In the years immediately after the implementation of the 
cert pool, there was virtually no change in the vote cohesion of 
the Justices who joined the pool. Moreover, by the mid 1980s, 
when cert-pool memos were making explicit recommendations 
regarding which cases should be granted review, vote cohesion 
among the Justices in the pool declined. The Justices who were 
not in the cert pool also showed a relatively high level of vote 
cohesion that declined over time. All of this suggests that factors 
other than the cert pool were influencing the Justices' votes re-
garding certiorari. 
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The data in Table 2 are important in that they provide a 
comparison of the cert-pool Justices' cohesiveness before and af-
ter the implementation of the cert pool and a comparison to the 
non-cert pool justices. But these data reflect the number of 
times Justices voted in blocs, and thus potentially overstates the 
influence of the cert pool. These data do not specify how often 
the cert-pool justices voted in blocs as the cert pool recom-
mended these justices should vote, a rather key assumption in as-
sessing the actual influence of the cert pool over the Court's 
agenda. Justices could be voting together as a bloc, but against 
the cert-pool recommendation. 
Table 3 shows the number of Justices in the cert pool who 
voted as the cert-pool memo recommended.22 
Table 3 
Voting Blocs Matching Cert-Pool Memo Recommendations 
1972-1974* 1984-1985** 
Number of Justices in the cert pool 
who voted as a bloc as the cert 
pool recommended: 
6 18% (38) 
5 41% (32) 19% (40) 
4 17% (13) 18% (37) 
3 11% (9) 14% (30) 
2 9% (7) 14% (30) 
1 1% (1) 6% (13) 
0 22% (17) 10%(20) 
(N = 79) (N = 208) 
*This column includes only those cases in which the cert pool memo recom-
mended grant or note, deny or dismiss, and at least 4 pool justices participated. 
**This column includes only those cases in which the cert pool memo recom-
mended grant or note, deny or dismiss, and at least 5 pool justices participated. 
22. This data includes only the cases in which the clerk writing the memo made a 
clear recommendation to grant or note, deny or dismiss, which explains the small number 
for the 1972-1974 period. Cases in which the cert-pool memo recommended some other 
action are also excluded. 
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During the 1972-1974 period, in 41% of the cases in which the 
pool memo made a recommendation, all five Justices in the pool 
voted accordingly. In an additional 17%, four of the cert-pool 
Justices voted as the cert pool recommended. If these two cate-
gories are added, at least four of the Justices in the cert pool 
agreed with the cert pool recommendation 58% of the time. But 
it is important to keep in mind that during this early period, the 
data include only half of the cases granted review, given the high 
number of cases in which the cert-pool memo made no recom-
mendation. Thus, during the early years of the cert pool, the 
cert-pool Justices voted cohesively as the cert-pool memo rec-
ommended in only one-fourth of the cases that made it onto the 
Court's docket. What is even more surprising is that 22% of the 
time, or about just as often, the Justices in the cert pool unani-
mously rejected the cert-pool recommendation. 
During the 1984-1985 period, the Justices in the pool voted 
as a bloc of four or more in support of the cert-pool recommen-
dation 55% of the time, essentially the same rate as the earlier 
period. Thus, even when the pool memo was more likely to 
make a recommendation, the Justices were not any more likely 
to follow it. The Justices were much less likely, however, to 
unanimously reject the cert-pool recommendation; they voted as 
a bloc of six against the cert-pool memo only 10% of the time. 
None of this, however, accounts for the votes of the non-
cert pool Justices. If the non-cert pool Justices are voting with 
the pool Justices in these cases, then something other than the 
pool-memo is catching the justices' attention. Unanimous cases 
are a prime example. During the 1972-1974 period, 22% of the 
time (17 cases) the Court unanimously agreed with the pool 
memo recommendation to grant review. During the 1984-1985 
period, 8% of the time (16 cases) the Court unanimously agreed 
with the pool memo to grant review. These are cases that more 
than likely would have been granted review even without a cert-
pool recommendation. Once these are accounted for, the poten-
tial influence of the cert pool declines even more. 
In addition, the cert-pool Justices rarely voted as a bloc 
against the non-cert-pool Justices. During the 1972-1974 period, 
there was only one case in which the cert-pool memo recom-
mended a grant, the cert-pool Justices agreed and voted as a bloc 
of four to grant, and the non-cert-pool justices voted as a unani-
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mous bloc to deny.23 There were no cases in which all five cert-
pool Justices voted against all four non-cert-pool Justices. Dur-
ing the 1984-1985 period, there were 29 cases in which the cert-
pool memo recommended a grant, the cert-pool justices agreed 
and voted as a bloc of four or more to grant, and the non-cert-
pool justices voted as a unanimous bloc to deny. This is a sub-
stantial increase from the earlier period, but is still only 19% of 
the cases in which the cert-pool memo recommended a grant. 
As a proportion of all cases ultimately granted review by the 
Court, this is a mere 10%. Thus, only in a few cases did a cert-
pool voting bloc thwart the wishes of the non-cert pool Justices. 
In the vast majority of cases, Justices in the cert pool and out of 
the cert pool were voting together to determine which cases 
were selected. Once again, this suggests that the influence of the 
cert pool over the Court's agenda is mitigated by the independ-
ent judgments of the Justices themselves. Whatever influence 
the cert pool may have over the Court's agenda is more than 
likely attributable to the fact that the Justices and the clerks are 
using the same criteria to evaluate cases. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Much of the recent criticism of the cert pool surrounds the 
current status of the Court, with eight of the nine Justices par-
ticipating in the pool. Conceivably, the cert pool's influence has 
become more pronounced since the mid-1980's with almost the 
entire Court in the pool. Unfortunately, cert-pool memos and 
reliable cert votes from the 1990's are not publicly available/4 
but the data from earlier periods are suggestive. Eliminating the 
cases in which the cert-pool memo did not make a recommenda-
tion, the rate at which the Court agreed with the cert pool 
slightly declined from 57% during the 1972-1974 Terms to 51% 
during the 1984-1985 Terms. If the cert pool now has more in-
fluence, it means that this trend has been reversed. Vote cohe-
sion between the Justices also substantially declined from the 
early years of the cert pool to the 1984-1985 terms, and the cert 
pool probably has become even less cohesive in the 1990s. 
When the cert pool was created, those in the pool were largely 
23. Preliminary Memo, Renegotiation Board v. Bannercraft Co., File Number 72-
822, Powell Archives, Wash. and Lee U. Sch. of L. Cert pool votes from Docket Sheet 
72-822, Box 421. Papers of Justice Brennan, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. 
24. Currently, there are no pool memos publicly available from the period after 
Powell left the Court in 1986. 
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from the same ideological wing of the Court. All four of Nixon's 
appointees joined the pool, along with Justice White. Even dur-
ing the 1984-1985 terms, with the addition of Justice O'Connor, 
there was still a relatively clear ideological break between those 
in the pool and those out of the pool. Today, there is less ideo-
logical cohesion between the Justices in the pool, with the addi-
tion of Justices Scalia, Thomas, Ginsburg and Breyer. 
At any rate, the simple fact that the Court disagreed with 
the pool memo in almost half of the cases that were granted re-
view is quite astonishing. Moreover, after the cert pool was im-
plemented, vote cohesion between the Justices in the pool de-
clined. Little evidence exists of a cohesive cert-pool voting bloc, 
or more specifically, of a cert-pool voting bloc controlling a sig-
nificant amount of the Court's agenda. If any cert-pool voting 
bloc existed, Justices who were not in the cert pool usually voted 
with the Justices in the cert pool, which substantially weakens 
the possible influence of the cert pool. Moreover, the cert pool 
did not have a clear or consistent impact on the voting behavior 
of individual Justices. In general, their agreement rates declined 
over time as well. Thus, it appears that the cert pool serves pri-
marily as a time-saver and not an initial case-screener; it merely 
provides the Justices with summarized versions of case records. 
To a surprisingly large extent, the cert pool does not determine 
which cases the Court ultimately decides. The decision to grant 
review is still based on the independent judgments of the Jus-
tices. 
